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What made Britannia great?  How much of the rise of 








By 1850, at the apogee of its power, Britain had 1.8% of world population.  
The area of the British Isles is less than 0.2% of the world land mass.  Yet Britain 
then strode as a colossus on the world political, military and economic stages. 
It had enormous colonial possessions including Ireland, much of modern India 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape 
Colony in South Africa, Belize, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana.  Its navy was the 
largest in the world, by design larger than the next two largest navies combined.  In 
1842 it humiliated the proud Chinese empire, forcing it to cede Hong Kong, and to 
                                                 
1 The data underlying this paper was compiled with the aid of National Science Foundation 
grants SES 91-22191 and SES 02-41376.  I thank Tim Hatton, Kevin O’Rourke, and Alan 
Taylor for helpful editorial comments.   2
allow the British to ship opium into China.  By 1860 the British and French had 
captured Beijing and forced even more degrading terms on the empire.
2   
Even where it did not exert formal control Britain considerably influenced the 
economic policy of many states, as in the Indian sub-continent.  Britain was so 
confident of its manufacturing prowess that it pursued both within its formal empire 
and beyond a policy of free trade, even though many of its trading partners had far 
lower wages.  Thus Britain supported Brazilian independence from Portugal in 
return for preferential trade privileges, and used the threat of force in both Egypt 
and Persia in 1841 to persuade these states to grant it free trade.
3   
  The ascendance of this minor country on the northwest corner of Europe, 
which in 1700 had a population about one-third that of France, and about 4% that of 
both China and India, to the position of power it occupied by 1850 is often seen as 
being largely the result of the Industrial Revolution which occurred in Britain after 
1760.  Thus Paul Kennedy wrote 
[the Industrial Revolution]...was to provide the foundation for the 
country’s continuing and increasing growth, making it in to a new 
sort of state – the only real world power at the time.  Industrialization 
not only furthered the British supremacy in commerce and finance 
                                                 
2 It is claimed that by 1855 Chinese tariff policy was firmly under British control, the only 
restraint on the British being the fear of toppling the current regime by pushing them too 
far. 
3 The British and French similarly in 1845 intervened in Uruguay in support of a liberal 
regime that favored freer trade.  Cain and Hopkins (1980, 479-81).     3
and shipping, it also underpinned its own naval supremacy with a 
previously unheard-of economic potential (Kennedy, 1983, 150-1). 
   He states even more bluntly, “Britain enjoyed effortless naval supremacy in the 
years following 1815” in part because its competitors “possessed an industrial 
strength that was infantile by comparison” (Kennedy, 1983, 157).  The eventual 
decline of Britain’s political and military position is similarly traced to the decline of 
its economic position.  “Whether historians date the beginnings of imperial decline 
from about 1870 or after 1914, they associate it almost exclusively with the steady 
erosion of Britain’s industrial supremacy” (Cain and Hopkins, 1986, 502).  
However, Britain in the years 1760 to 1860 experienced two completely 
different, and independent, revolutionary changes. The first, of course, was the 
famous Industrial Revolution based on technological advance in industry. But the 
second was a population explosion that has been dubbed by some the 
“Demographic Revolution”. This growth in population occurred all across the 
English economy with equal force, from the centers of the new revolutionized 
industry, to the remotest rural backwater.
4 It began just before the discoveries in 
cotton textiles that date the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the late 1760s. 
But there is no direct link between population growth and the unusual technological 
growth of England in this era.  
                                                 
4 Wrigley et al. (1997), 182-194, show for their sample group of 26 reconstituted parishes 
that fertility increases were as great in those classified as rural, as in those which were 
engaged in trade or industry.   4
Here I argue that for most of the ways in which the Industrial Revolution 
mattered for the British position in the world – relative living standards compared to 
Britain’s competitors, relative economic output, relative military capacity – the 
technological gains of the Industrial Revolution were irrelevant. Suppose efficiency 
(TFP) in both industry and agriculture in the 1860s stayed exactly as it had been in 
the 1730s. This would have significantly reduced living standards in England by the 
1860s compared to their actual level. But it would have effected little Britain’s 
relative position in the world economy, its income relative to its competitors such as 
France or the Netherlands.  The size of the industrial sector would have been nearly 
as large, and the degree of urbanization nearly as great. Britain would have still 
shifted in the late eighteenth century from near autarky towards great reliance on raw 
material imports paid for by manufactured exports.  That shift would have in turn 
given the political impetus for formal and informal Imperialism, and the desire to 
maintain a strong Navy to protect vital shipping routes.  
If, however, England’s population had stayed at its 1730s then even with 
significant technological advance, most of the features of the Industrial Revolution 
era would not be replicated.  With a population size in 1815 of closer to 6 than to 12 
million, the defeat of Napoleon would have been more difficult, even with the classic 
productivity growth of the Industrial Revolution. A Britain with smaller population 
in 1860 would have been much more agriculture, more rural, less urbanized. 
Crucially it would have engaged in much less international trade. Thus one of the   5
great driving forces for nineteenth century imperialism, the need to assure markets 
for Britain’s great manufacturing exports, and to assure raw material supplies for the 
British economy, would have been absent. The supply of officials, police and soldiers 
to govern Britain’s colonial possessions would similarly have been reduced, as would 
the supply of convict labor to people Australia.
5  Even with the same rate of TFP 
advance in each industry, the overall rate of productivity growth for the economy 
would have slowed significantly had a population boom not accompanied the 
Industrial Revolution. 
This paper is not the first to consider such counterfactuals.  Joel Mokyr 
considered what income per person would be in England in 1830 absent 
technological advance (Mokyr, 1999, 114-5).  His conclusion, however, was that 
technological change was likely more important to income levels than is suggested by 
the model developed here. More recently Nick Crafts and Knick Harley carried out a 
related counterfactual exercise, for the shorter period 1770-1841, which focused just 
on what most importantly caused the shift of the labor force in Britain out of 
agriculture in the Industrial Revolution: population growth, unbalanced technological 
progress in industry, or labor releasing institutional change in agriculture (Crafts and 
Harley (2004)).  Their conclusion, contrary to this paper, is that population growth 
played a very minor role in reducing the share employed in agriculture by 1841. 
Instead they conclude, in line with Patrick O’Brien, that it was the (alleged) switch in 
                                                 
5 Convicts were transported to Australia between 1788 and 1852. By 1840 Britain had 
shipped 111,000 convicts.   6
Industrial Revolution England from peasant to capitalist agriculture, which 
substantially increased labor productivity in agriculture, that accounted for most of 
the structural shift (O’Brien (1996)).  I show below that this conclusion stems from 
their assumption that, absent population growth, non-farm prices would have risen 
significantly relative to farm prices.  I also explain why the assumption made here, 
that the relative prices observed in the 1860s would be the same at a smaller British 
population, is the right one. 
 
English Economic History, 1730s-1860s 
Table 1 shows the basic facts of the English economy from the 1730s to the 
1860s, as constructed from new data on prices, wages, land rents and returns to 
capital.
6 Total nominal income is calculated for the economy as a whole and for the 
farm sector. This income was deflated by various different price indices, calculated as 
detailed in appendix 2, to calculate the growth of GDP, farm output, non-farm 
output and income.
7  
England moved from an agrarian autarkic economy in the 1730s, to a largely 
industrialized open economy in the 1860s. From the 1730s to 1860s population 
                                                 
6 This data construction is still in part a work in progress, but the series are near enough to 
there final form that they can serve as a good preliminary basis for the discussion below. 
 
7 These data differ in a number of ways from the well known series of Crafts and Harley 
(1992) on output growth in Industrial Revolution England. In particular there is less growth 
of farm output than  Harley (1993) assumes in these years on the basis of CGE modeling of 
the Industrial Revolution (neither Crafts and Harley (1992) nor Harley (1993) has direct 
observations on farm output).   7
increased to more than 3.5 times its level in the 1730s, mainly from the increased 
birth rate. Yet agricultural output increased by only 54%. Thus farm output per 
person in England in the 1860s was only 42% of its level in the 1730s.
8  This 
domestic farm output was supplemented by two main sources of the goods 
traditionally produced by the farm sector. First were imports of food and raw 
materials. Second was English coal output. Thus by the 1860s England depended 
heavily on food and raw material imports, and on locally mined coal, to supply the 
food, raw materials and energy its population required. Table 2 shows the food, 
energy and raw materials account for the 1700s, where the situation would be very 
similar to the 1730s, and the 1860s. In the 1700s the economy had few net raw 
material imports (sugar and spices were being imported, but wool in woolen goods 
exported). These had swollen to 22% of income by the 1860s.  
Since coal was a close substitute for wood energy produced in the farm sector 
in what follows, and in table 1, I amalgamate domestic coal production with farming 
output (coal production in this period was very similar to farming, involving a lot of 
digging and man hauling of materials, except done underground). Valuing coal 
output at pithead prices increases “farm” output per person in the 1860s to 48% of 
the level of the 1730s, as opposed to 42%.  This is the number reported in table 1. 
                                                 
8 This claim based on Clark (2002c), Clark (2004) is controversial. Allen (1994), for example, 
suggest much more output growth. But it is founded on very strong estimates of the factor 
incomes and prices in agriculture in these years.   8
England paid for imported food and raw materials mainly through exporting 
manufactures. As Peter Temin noted, these included not just the classic textiles and 
iron and steel of the new Industrial Revolution industries, but a host of products 
from industries that are not believed to have experienced significant technological 
advances (Temin (1997)).  Together other manufactures were about 22% of all 
exports. With this rise in exports non-farm output rose nearly ten fold between the 
1730s and 1860s. England truly became the workshop of the world. 
Relative prices changed in England over these years, as relative productivities 
in different sectors of the economy changed. The price of non-farm output relative 
to farm output fell to 72% of its earlier level. Figure 1 shows the price of English 
produced non-farm items relative to the price of farm output, and the price of 
English exports relative to imports. Export prices declined even more relative to 
import prices.   
Importantly for what follows the decline in the relative price of non-farm to 
farm goods closely echoed the observed changes in relative productivities across the 
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where r is the return on capital, w the wage, s land rents, A the TFP of the sector, 
and a, b, and c  the shares of each input in costs. The relative price of non-farm 


























Over the Industrial Revolution era agricultural efficiency increased by only 21%, and 
coal mining efficiency growth was also modest (Clark, 2002c, Clark and Jacks, 2006). 
Efficiency growth was concentrated in the non-farm, non-mining sector, where it is 
estimated at 60%.  Thus the relative prices of non-farm goods fell only slightly more 
than their relative production productivity within England.  The reason that relative 
price movements in the Industrial Revolution were largely predictable from relative 
TFP levels is that capital rents, wages and land rents moved in similar ways over the 
years 1730 to 1870.  Thus the different shares of these factors in the farm and non-
farm sectors made little difference to relative prices.   
These relative price movements also imply that the productivity gains of the 
Industrial Revolution mainly went to consumers rather than the entrepreneurs in the 
revolutionized sectors. Importantly these consumers lived abroad as well as at home. 
We can portray this transformation of England between the 1730s and 1860s 
summarized in table 1 using Production Possibilities Frontiers. Figure 2 shows 
outputs and consumption in each period, and the associated relative price lines. 
 
British History, 1730s-1860s – A Simple Model 
What would Britain have looked like in the 1860s without the Industrial 
Revolution?  To consider this counterfactual I employ the simple model detailed in   10
the appendix. There are just two goods, farm (including coal) and non-farm, and 
only two inputs, land and labor.
9  Farm output requires land, but not non-farm.  
Britain in the 1730s is assumed self sufficient with no net imports of farm products.  
I am not, however, assuming that the economy in the 1730s was closed to 
international trade.  The assumption is just that the relative more equal land 
endowments of England and the other European states as of the 1730s, as portrayed 
in table 3, limited the possibilities of trade.  
The six parameters of the model – α, β, AF, ANF, θ and H – are chosen so that 
the crucial features of the 1730s economy are reproduced: the share of land rents in 
total output, the share of employment in each sector, the share of output from each 
sector, the absence of significant farm imports, and the income elasticity of farm 
output demand.  
Fitting the model to these data for the 1730s requires setting all six parameters, 
leaving no degrees of freedom to adjust the results for the 1860s. Thus the model 
cannot precisely fit the actual situation in the 1860s. Once population, AF, ANF and 
the labor share in agriculture were set for the 1860s, all the other variables were 
constrained.  Thus as will be seen by comparing the last column of table 1 with the 
second column of table 4, the model only approximates the key parameters in the 
1860s.  In particular the price of non-farm output relative to farm is 0.674 as 
opposed to the correct value of 0.716.  However the fit with these parameters 
                                                 
9 This is because capital is assumed supplied elastically at a fixed rate of return, so that with 
the production functions used capital per worker in each sector remains the same.   11
derived from the 1730s, as well as these efficiency changes, is still very good for the 
1860s.
10   
The shift from the 1730s to the 1860s as estimated from this simple model 
looks just like figure 2.  Thus this very simple model, parameterized for the 1730s 
economy, fits the gross outlines of the Industrial Revolution reasonably well.  In the 
following sections I employ this model to ask what history would have looked like 
absent either the “Demographic Revolution” or the “Industrial Revolution.” 
 
England in the 1860s without Productivity Growth 
Suppose we abolished all the productivity growth of the Industrial Revolution 
era. What would England look like in the 1860s?  To answer this we need to crucially 
answer what would be the relative price of industrial as opposed to farm goods in 
that case in the 1860s.  
I assume that this would stay as in the 1730s. The justification for this is that 
the English price relativity in the 1730s seems to have been close to the European 
price ratio. Indeed food prices were low enough in England that in some years in the 
early eighteenth century there were grain exports.  And English demand and supply 
of food and raw materials was a small share of European and North American 
demand. Table 3, for example, gives data illustrating the smallness of England 
                                                 
10 Land rents as a share of income may seem low in the 1730s compared to the 
measured share of land rents, but the rent here is the pure site value of the land, and that in 
England was much less than the rent paid per acre which included rents for housing, roads, 
fences, and other land improvements.    12
relative to just Europe and North America in terms of farm area and population in 
these years.  It also shows the enormous addition of farmland and woodland in the 
USA to the effective European land stock in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. The farm area of England by the 1860s was less than one tenth that of the 
rest of Western Europe, and only about 2% of the combined area of all areas 
shipping food to England.  
Thus without an Industrial Revolution there is no reason to expect farm prices 
to have become higher relative to non-farm prices in England by the 1860s 
compared to the 1730s.  Instead the addition of the farm areas of North America 
would, if anything, have increased non-farm prices in England relative to farm, 
leading to even greater industrialization than predicted here. 
  With the assumption of an unchanged price ratio, figure 3 shows the predicted 
outcome for the economy with no Industrial Revolution. What is remarkable is that 
apart from the lower level of industrial output per person, England looks just the 
same in the 1860s without an Industrial Revolution than it did with it. Table 4 shows 
the detailed predicted values of various features of the economy. The share 
employed in farming (including coal) is predicted to have fallen sharply from 55% to 
30%, compared to the actual fall to 24%. Land rents fall from 21% of income to 
11%, creating exactly the decline in the economic position of the traditional landed 
ruling classes as was actually witnessed.    13
Imports supply as large or larger a share of “farm” consumption by the 1860s, 
at 57%.  Industrial production rises sharply to pay for these food, raw material and 
energy imports, so that total industrial output is nearly 5 times its level of the 1730s, 
despite the absence of productivity advances. This shift to industrial production 
would have produced the rise in towns and cities in England that were witnessed in 
the Industrial Revolution era. The need to pay for food and raw materials with 
exports of manufactured product would have supplied the same impetus as before, 
given the protectionist tendencies of independent states such as the USA, to use 
military power to ensure access to markets through a process of formal and informal 
imperialism. 
  Incomes per person would of course have been significantly lower in this case 
than they were in practice in the 1860s, and indeed about 6% lower than they were in 
the 1730s. But in terms of Britain’s position relative to its competitors – France in 
particular – the absence of the Industrial Revolution would make modest differences. 
For the competitive nature of product and labor markets, and the very poor 
protection of property rights in new techniques in the Industrial Revolution era, 
meant that there was little extra gain to those areas and people who devised more 
effective production techniques in the cases where the outputs were tradable. The 
main gainers from the improved techniques of the Industrial Revolution were the 
consumers of the products, and it did not matter whether these consumers were in 
England, in Ireland, or in the Netherlands or France.    14
  This can be illustrated in several ways. First consider what happened to real 
wages in the Industrial Revolution period in the north versus the south of England. 
Figure 4 shows that these two regions had very different productivity growth rates in 
these years. The north with its heavy emphasis on the revolutionized sectors of 
cotton, linen and wool textiles saw rapid productivity growth.  The south, which was 
much more heavily involved in agriculture, in government, and in services, witnesses 
very little productivity growth at all. In many ways the south of England had the 
same relationship to the Industrial Revolution as France or the Netherlands. It was a 
bystander. Corresponding to this difference in productivity growth was a difference 
in population growth as labor migrated south to north, and from Ireland to the 
north. Thus from 1801 to 1841 the north had a 103% gain in population but the 
south only a 71% gain. 
But despite the huge difference in productivity growth rates, and the evidence 
of labor migration, wages in the north rose little relative to those in the south. Figure 
5 shows the relative wage in the north versus the south for building workers and 
farm workers from the 1760s to 1860s. Wages in the north increased relative to those 
in the south by only 11% in the mainly urban building industry and 25% in 
agriculture. The great majority of the Industrial Revolution productivity gains in the 
north went to consumers all across England, and indeed across the world, in the 
form of lower prices. There was a relatively elastic supply of labor and capital from 
traditional industries, from agriculture, and from non-revolutionized regions into the   15
flagship industries of the Industrial Revolution.  Consequently the efficiency 
advances went to consumers. 
Evidence of this can be found in the movement of real wages in Ireland 
compared to England in these years. Ireland had few of the high productivity growth 
industries of the Industrial Revolution, except for linens. By the nineteenth century 
its main exports were agricultural products sent to England in exchange for industrial 
goods: clothing, housewares, machinery. Its labor market, as measured by the much 
lower wage in Ireland than in England was less integrated with that of the high 
productivity growth region of northern England as was the rest of England. Yet as 
figure 6 shows real wages, as measured for building workers in Ireland, grew just as 
fast as those in England, even in the years before the famine of 1845 when Ireland’s 
population was growing fast. 
  Finally we can do a very rough comparison on income per person from 1600 
on for England and the Netherlands. Figure 7 shows that comparison, using both my 
estimates of English real income per person, and the GDP estimates of Crafts-
Harley (1992) for 1700-1831 and Deane and Cole (1967) for 1831-1871. Any gains in 
English income compared to the Netherlands would show up in the decades after 
the 1780s, since there was no significant TFP advance in England as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution until the 1790s. Yet between the decade of the 1780s and the 
1860s, in an interval when income per person in England rose 53% as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution, income per person in the Netherlands relative to England fell   16
by only 12%. Income per capita in the Netherlands rose 39% as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution, almost as much as in England. Britain gained little compared 
to either Ireland or the Netherlands as a result of the technological advances of the 
Industrial Revolution, and I suspect the same may be true of other countries such as 
France. So the loss in England’s comparative position in Europe – in terms of total 
output relative to its competitors from the absence of an Industrial Revolution 
would be small. The gains of the IR were being exported to England’s competitors, 
either in the form of more favorable terms of trade for English industrial goods, or 
in the form of the use of the knowledge itself for production in these countries. 
  Thus Britain in the nineteenth century, absent the technologies of the 
Industrial Revolution, would not have been significantly poorer compared to its 
European competitors.   
But could it have achieved the same domination outside Europe with a GDP 
that was one third lower in the 1860s, without steam power, and without cheap iron 
and steel for European weapons?  Here it is important to emphasize that naval 
power remained based on sailing ships until surprisingly late in the Industrial 
Revolution.  The first steam powered ocean going warship, the French Le Napoléon, 
did not enter service until 1852.  This was still a wooden ship.  The modern iron-
hulled armored battleship came only with the British Warrior which entered service in 
1861.  So up until 1850 naval ships would have looked very similar with no Industrial 
Revolution.   17
  Similarly the triumph of the British Navy in the Napoleonic War era was 
achieved not mainly by technological advantages that the Industrial Revolution 
conferred on British ships, but by the greater sailing abilities of the British, and their 
ability to deliver a much higher rate of fire from their guns (Kennedy, 1983, 123-8, 
Baugh, 2004).  In part these abilities came from the large numbers of British 
merchant seamen the Royal Navy could draw on from their normal employment in 
coastal and foreign shipping.  But the switch to an industrial economy created by 
population growth even absent the Industrial Revolution would have created similar 
increases in the volume of British merchant shipping after 1760.  
 
English History, 1760-1860 without the Demographic Revolution 
Alternatively what would happen if the Industrial Revolution had occurred in 
an England that maintained after 1740 the population stability that had characterized 
it for the hundred years before 1740? To consider this counterfactual all I fix 
population in the 1860s in the model detailed in the appendix to its value in the 
1730s. I assume productivity advance by sector was the same as in the actual 
Industrial Revolution, as were relative farm and non-farm prices. 
  The prices are kept at those of the actual 1860s prices on the basis of the 
discussion above that relative price movements in the Industrial Revolution era seem 
to have depended mainly on relative productivity movements.  A smaller population 
in England by the 1860s would have reduced farm product demands for the   18
European and North American suppliers of England.  But given the population sizes 
of Britain versus its trading partners, shown in table 3, the effect would have been 
minimal. 
The results are shown in figure 8, and detailed in the last column of table 4. 
Now farm production within England is close to farm consumption, so that there is 
little net export of industrial goods or net import of farm produce. The share of the 
labor force in the farm sector at 48% is close to the share in the 1730s. England in 
these respects looks much as it did in the 1730s.
11 
  Real income would increase somewhat more than it did with this model when 
population growth accompanied the Industrial Revolution (44% versus 35%), 
because of the greater amount of land per person. But GDP increases by only 52% 
overall, compared to 229% under the alternative counterfactual of not productivity 
gains but substantial population growth. Similarly total industrial production 
increases more from population growth than from the productivity advances of the 
Industrial Revolution per se.  
                                                 
11 In contrast Crafts and Harley (2004) in a CGE exercise concludes that population 
growth explains only a modest part of the structural change in the British economy in the 
years 1770-1841.  This conclusion follows mainly from the assumption that, absent British 
population growth, the British terms of trade would have shifted 44% towards industrial 
products.  Without such a shift the absence of population growth in their model raises the 
farm share in employment in 1841 from the observed 22% to ≈39%.  This is similar to the 
results in table 4.   
I have discussed above why assuming relative industrial prices would be substantial 
higher at the end of the Industrial Revolution without British population growth seems 
unwarranted.   
   19
  The economy wide growth of TFP would have been lower without population 
growth, even though the growth rates in each sector were the same. This is because 
the national TFP growth rate is  
∑ =
i
TFP i TFP i g g η
       
where i indexes sub-sectors of the economy and ηi their share in value added in the 
economy. In the model economy TFP grows 21% in farming and 60% in industry. 
But the increase in the relative size of the farming sector without population growth 
reduces overall TFP growth from 45% to 39%. Thus though there was no direct 
connection between population growth and the TFP advance of the Industrial 
Revolution, indirectly population growth contributed more to TFP advance in 
Britain in the Industrial Revolution than did most of the innovators celebrated in the 
conventional histories of the period. Population growth alone increase national 
productivity advance by more than 15%. 
  In this connection we also see that another factor leading to greater measured 
rates of TFP advance in England in the Industrial Revolution era that appears in this 
model is the low share of the population in England already, by the 1730s, engaged 
in farm production. At 55% this was low by the conventional standards for pre-
industrial economies where we typically find 70-80% of the population engaged in 
farming. English incomes in the 1730s were high for a pre-industrial economy, 
because England in the years 1600-1740 followed a strong version of the European   20
Marriage Pattern which significantly limited fertility (see Wrigley et al., 1997). In the 
Malthusian world before 1800, England was unusually wealthy, and consequently the 
farm share in consumption was low. 
  Even with the sectoral productivity growth rates of the Industrial Revolution, 
without the demographic changes England in the 1860s would have had much less 
trade with the rest of the world, and hence much less incentive to maintain and 
defend bases on these trade routes, and to secure access for its manufactures to 
markets across the world. Thus Britain’s outward orientation in the nineteenth 
century, its engagement with the rest of the world, can be attributed much more to 
unusual population growth than to unusual development of technology. 
 
Conclusion 
Britain by 1850 was the envy of nations.  It had high living standards, extensive 
colonies, extensive informal political influence, and the biggest navy in the world.  
There is a tendency to think that the explanation of the relative economic and 
political success of Britain by 1850 must lie with the technological advances of the 
Industrial Revolution.   
  Here I have argued to the contrary that very little of the position of Britain in 
1850 is directly explained by such things as innovations in textiles.  High British 
incomes relative to its competitors were probably mainly achieved before the 
Industrial Revolution. Insofar as economic forces influenced the political and   21
military successes of Britain, the one that mattered more in the competition with the 
other European states was population growth not technological advance. Further the 
transformation of Britain from the 1730s to the 1860s from a heavily agrarian 
economy dominated politically by the landed classes to the urban, industrialized 
economy of the 1860s again depended almost entirely on population advances. 
Finally the outward orientation of the economy, with huge volumes of imports and 
exports, and a substantial merchant navy, with the political and military 
consequences that entailed, again was created by population growth, not 
technological advance.  
Thus it seems that Britain's rise to world dominance was a product more of 
the bedroom labors of British workers than of their factory toil.   22
Appendix 1: The Model 
Production 
There are two sectors in the model economy, farm and non-farm. The production 
functions for these, per capita, are 
  
a
NF NF NF n A q =    





q − = 1   
where nNF is the share of labor in the non-farm sector, nF the share in the primary 
sector (including coal). N is total population. Industry has no land constraint, but 
agriculture does. Since I assume that there is a perfectly elastic supply of capital at a 
constant real rate of return, r, capital in the industrial sector will be employed in fixed 
proportion to labor. That is why capital is not shown explicitly. 
This implies that the production possibilities frontier (PPF) for England, 
































The marginal rate of transformation (MRT) from farm into non-farm output, the 
slope of the PPF at any level of qF, is 







































1    23
The curvature of the MRT is determined by a and b. The larger these are the less 
curvature. In the simulations b is taken as 0.750 on the basis of studies of English 
agriculture (Clark, 2002c). To fit the empirical data in the 1730s with this simple 
model we also need to have a = 0.614. This is because the share of agriculture in the 








Since in the 1730s, nF  = 0.55, and sF = 0.50, that in turn implies that a = 0.614 























The utility function of the representative consumer is, 
  
) 1 ( ) ( ) , (
θ θ − − = NF F NF F q H q q q U  
Taking agricultural output as the numeraire, the budget constraint is 
NF NF F q p q y + =  
Maximizing utility subject to this constraint gives 
   H y qF ) 1 ( θ θ − + = ,   H y ≥  
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Thus the consumer is assumed to consume a minimum subsistence food amount H, 
then a constant share, θ, of income above H as food. Thus at income y = H, only 
food is consumed. As income rises the food share falls. θ was taken as 0.25 in the 
simulations. 
  With this specification the income elasticity of demand for farm and non-farm 
outputs are 



























NF η  
At very high levels of income both income elasticities approach 1. At close to the 
subsistence level of food consumption, H, the income elasticity for food approaches 
θ, and that for industrial products approaches infinity. θ and H were chosen to make 
the income elasticity of demand for food in the simulation be about 0.5, in line with 
empirical estimates (Clark, Huberman and Lindert, 1995). 
  The price elasticities of demand are 
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Again, as y gets very large both price elasticities approach -1. At close to the 
subsistence level of food consumption H, the price elasticity for food is lower and 
approaches -0.25. 
 
Appendix 2:  Price Indices for England 1730-1869 
Define the following price indices: 
PFO  =   price of final outputs of the English economy (retail prices), 
PGDP  =   price of gross domestic output, 
PM  =   price of imports (wholesale prices), 
PX  =   price of exports, 
PDC  =   price of domestic consumption (including investment), 
PF  =   price of domestic farm output (including coal), 
PNF  =   price of domestic non-farm output. 












where the ai and bi are the shares respectively in import and export costs of each 
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For each price the annual rate of change is defined as 




= π  
Define θ as the ratio of the value of imports to GDP. Then 
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where  1 = ∑
i
i c , but the individual weights can be positive or negative. Negative 
weights will correspond to imported commodities. 
  Both the final output and import prices are measured as including all taxes and 
fees. By similar reasoning we can also establish that, where φ as the ratio of the value 
of imports to domestic consumption, 
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If trade is in balance, so that the value of imports equals that of exports (θ=φ), then 
this simplifies to  





P P θ + =  
To calculate real GDP we thus just deflate total nominal incomes in the economy by 
the GDP deflator. To calculate real income we deflate by the Domestic 
Consumption deflator. 
Farm versus non-farm 
The rate of increase of the price of GDP can also be decomposed into the rate of 
increase of the price of domestic farm output and domestic non-farm output, using 
the share of GDP that was domestic farm output. Thus, 
NF F GDP π µ µπ π ) 1 ( − + =  
I use this expression to calculate the movement of non-farm prices from the 
movement of GDP prices, and that of farm output.   28
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Figure 1:  Terms of trade between farm and non-farm output, England, 1730s-
1860s 
 
Sources:  “Farm” Prices: Clark (2004) and Clark and Jacks (2006).  Non-farm prices, 
import prices and export prices are unpublished calculations of the author, from the 
sources listed in Clark (2005).   33
Figure 2:  The change in the English economy, 1730s to 1860s 
 
Source:  Table 1. 
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Figure 3:  England in the 1860s without the Industrial Revolution 
 
  
Source:  Table 4.   35
 









































Notes:  The north is Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, 
Durham, Yorkshire and Cheshire.  The aggregate productivity growth of England 
was split into the contribution from north and south by attributing all productivity 
growth in cotton and wool textiles to the north, and correspondingly reallocating 
farm productivity growth. 
Sources: As for table 1.   36
 
Figure 5:  Wages in the north versus the south in the Industrial Revolution 
 
 
Sources: Clark (2001), Clark (2005).   37
 
Figure 6:  Real wages in England and Ireland 
 
Sources:  Clark (2005, 1324-5), Ireland, Geary and Stark (2004).   38
Figure 7:  Income per person, the Netherlands versus England, 1600-1869 
 
 
Sources:  Income per person in England: Clark as for table 1, Crafts-Harley-Deane-
Cole from Crafts and Harley (1992), Deane and Cole (1967).  Recently Smits, 
Horlings and van Zanden (1999) estimated Dutch GDP from 1807 to 1913.  De 
Vries (2000) tentatively carries these estimates back to 1600.  Dutch GDP per capita 
in 1913 is assumed 79 percent that of England, based on Prados (2000).     39
Figure 8:  England in the 1860s without population growth 
 
 
Sources: Table 4.   40








    
Population (m)  5.8  21.1 
“Farm” Efficiency  100  121 
“Non-Farm” Efficiency  100  160 
pNF /pF  1.00 0.716 
    
“Farm” Share of employment  0.55  0.24 
Land Rent/GDP (%)  20.6  6.9 
    
GDP 100  548 
GDP per person  100  149 
Efficiency (TFP)  100  145 
“Farm” Share Output  0.50  0.20 
    
“Farm” Output  100  176 
“Farm” Output per person  100  48 
“Non-Farm” Output  100  980 
“Non-Farm” Output per person  100  269 
    
Farm Imports/GDP  0.0  0.22 
“Farm” Consumption per person  100  102 
Non-Farm Consumption per person  100  297 
Farm Share in Consumption  0.50  0.42 
    
Real Income/N  100  141 
Urban Share (%)  15  62 
    
 
Notes: Farm here includes the coal industry.  Non-farm is the economy minus farm 
and coal. 
Sources:  Nominal output is estimated as a combination of the estimates of Clark 
(1998, 1999, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2005), and Clark and Jacks (2006) on   41
farmland, property, wage, and capital incomes.  Real outputs are estimated from the 
prices from Clark (2004) and Clark and Jacks (2006) for farm and coal, and 
unpublished series for other prices.  Efficiencies are estimated as the ratio of costs to 
prices in each sector and nationally.  Population is from Wrigley et al. (1997).   42





    
Population (millions)  5.51  21.15 
    
English Farm net output (£ m.)  63.1  107.2 
    
Net Food Imports (£ m.)  2.2  75.2 
Net Raw Material Imports (£ m.)  -1.3  62.7 
Domestic Coal Consumption (£ m.) (at pithead 
price) 
1.7 17.5 
    
Total Food, Energy and Raw Material Consumption 
(£ m.) 
65.7 262.6 
    
Consumption per Person (£)  11.9  12.4 
    
Imports as a share of consumption  1%  53% 
    
 
Notes:  Cotton, wool, flax, and silk retained for home consumption are estimated by 
subtracting the raw material content of textile exports, estimated using figures given 
in Deane and Cole (1967). The import figures are for the UK, but it is assumed that 
on net these all went to England (Ireland was supplying food imports to England 
which I assume equaled its share of food and raw material imports). 
Sources:  Farm Output, Clark (2002c).  Coal: Flynn (1984, 26), Church (1986, 19, 53, 
85-97).  Pithead Prices, Clark and Jacks (2006).  Trade 1860-9: Parliamentary Papers 
(1870), Mitchell (1988), 221-2.  Trade 1700-9: Schumpeter (1960, tables VII, IX, X, 
XII, XIII, XV, XVII). 
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ENGLAND      
Population (m)  5.5  9.2  21 
Farm Area (m. ac.)  26  26  26 
Acres/N 4.7  2.8  1.2 
      
WESTERN EUROPE      
Population (m)  83*  103  152 




Acres/N 3.8  3.1  2.1 
      
RUSSIA      
Population (m)  42*  53  74 




Acres/N 16.7  13.2  9.5 
      
USA      
Population, USA (m)  ≈1  6.2 35 
Farm Area, USA (m. ac.)  -  -  407 
Acres/N -  -  11.6 
      
 
Notes:  Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.  
*Estimated to be equal to the 1760s populations. 
aBased on modern areas from the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Sources:  FAO, statistics database.  Mitchell (1998).   44















      
Population (m)  21.1  21.1  5.8 
“Farm” Efficiency  121  100  121 
“Non-Farm” Efficiency  160  100  160 
pNF /pF  0.674  1.00 0.674 
      
“Farm” Share of employment  0.24  0.30  0.48 
Land Rent/GDP (%)  8.7  10.7  17.7 
      
GDP 528  329  152 
GDP per person  145  90  152 
Efficiency (TFP)  145  100  139 
“Farm” Share Output  0.21  0.26  0.43 
      
“Farm” Output  171  167  110 
“Farm” Output per person  47  46  110 
“Non-Farm” Output  982  477  214 
“Non-Farm” Output per 
person 
270 131  214 
      
Farm Imports/GDP  0.26  0.35  0.02 
“Farm” Consumption per 
person 
107 94  114 
Non-Farm Consumption per 
person 
181 83  207 
Farm Share in Consumption  0.47  0.53  0.45 
      
Real Income/N  135  94  144 
      
 
Sources:  See text. 